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Introduction

The Economic Problem
Over the past two hundred years, the world has seen unprecedented growth rates in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, albeit very unevenly distributed across countries and regions. In the year 1820, world population had amounted to approximately 1.1 billion. In the same year, the value of all goods produced was estimated by Maddison (2006) at about USD 700 billion, measured in 1990 USD. By the year 2003, population had grown to around 6.4 billion people, while GDP was calculated by the UN to lay in the range of USD 40,900 billion. Correspondingly, GDP per capita had risen tenfold from approximately USD 640 to USD 6,400. Although the reconstruction of historical data determining past living standards has been subject to some debate, it is obvious that economic growth cannot have increased over the last few thousand years at the same speed as it did over the last two hundred years. A reprojection of those growth rates would result in absurdly low living conditions during medieval times. 1 It is therefore plausible to presume a premodern era of stagnation or at least very slow growth that Keynes (1930) had characterized as follows.
From the earliest times of which we have recordback, say, to two thousand years before Christ down to the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was no very great change in the standard of life of the average man living in the civilised centres of the earth. 2 By that time, he was well aware of the fact that roughly since the beginning of the English Industrial Revolution the world economy had begun to experience a transitional phase from stagnation to growth, optimistically concluding that assuming no important wars and no important increase in population, the economic problem may be solved, or be at least within sight of solution, within a hundred years. 3 Among others, Clark (2009) took up on the economic problem and collected historical data of GDP per capita illustrating the transition from a historical regime of stagnation to a regime of growth for the case of Great Britain in the form of the well-known hockey 1 Mokyr and Voth (2010) , p. 8.
2 Keynes (1930) , p. 1.
3 ibid., p. 4. stick. 4 These data do not simply reect British economic history, but can be globally generalized in so far as every economy once found itself or currently is located in a regime of stagnation. However, roughly at the beginning of the 19th century something changed, as England had apparently become the rst economy to generate sustained economic growth. 5 Reluctantly at rst, then progressively catching up, the major part of the world economy followed the English example. As Broadberry & O'Rourke (2010) put it, viewed in the grand sweep of history, this change was undoubtedly radical, and must be ranked alongside other epochmaking changes such as the change from hunting and gathering to settled agriculture. 6 Recently, North (2013) argued that the elucidation of the transition to growth seems to be the most important historical question that might conceivably be possible to answer. 7 Building on these assessments, the primary object of this work is to disentangle the eects that made for an era of stagnation and those enabling the transition to growth, or to use Keynes' wording, to solve the economic problem.
Having introduced the economic problem of stagnation and growth, the rest of the work is structured as follows. First, a set of stylized facts will be oered as a touchstone for unied growth models. Secondly, a new interpretation of the classical growth model is suggested to be capable of integrating the mechanisms of stagnation and growth.
More specically, the mechanisms will rely on the operation of four general principles that have partly been incorporated into neoclassical theory, while other parts seem to have disappeared along with classical theory. In order to arrive at an empirically testable macroeconomic growth model, rst, the propositions will be translated qualitatively into causal relationships. Then, these relationships will be quantitatively dened in a system of linear equations, exemplarily calibrated and simulated to show that the classical model can indeed account for the stylized facts of stagnation and growth.
After having checked the validity of the classical model with regard to the stylized facts, the third chapter deals with the empirical identication of the classical shortrun 5 The date 1800 is often chosen to mark the British takeo .
6 Broadberry & O'Rourke (2010) , p. 1.
7 As Lucas (1988) , p. 5, put it, The consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering: Once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think of anything else.
mechanisms between demographic and economic variables. To this end, a vectorautoregression is estimated and impulse response functions are employed to nd evidence of the causal corresponding relationships. The work concludes with the nding that the economic principles classical growth theory was built upon are found to prevail globally.
1.2
The Stylized Facts of Stagnation and Growth Mokyr and Voth (2010) summarized the development of the theoretical literature on stagnation and growth by stating that from the 1990s onwards, scholars started to search for an overarching theory that could encompass both slow growth and the transition to rapidly increasing per capita incomes a "unied growth model". The eld has ourished since. 8 The most comprehensive recent elaborations on the stylized facts of stagnation and growth are probably found in Clark (2007) and Galor (2011) , who suspect a causal link between the demographic transition and the breakout from the Malthusian trap. The focus on demographic variables is certainly not surprising given that the mechanism of stagnation is generally regarded to rely on a population trap. Following the stylized 8 Mokyr and Voth (2010) , p. 8.
time series illustrated in gure 1.1, the subsequent set of stylized facts regarding the demographic transition and the transition from stagnation to growth are viewed to be sustained by the data. Firstly, during the transition to growth, there is some evidence of causality running from demographic to economic variables. There is no modern economy in which GDP per capita increased sustainably that has not gone through a demographic transition. Secondly, the model of the demographic transition gives some evidence of death rates positively aecting birth rates. There is no modern economy in which a sustainable decrease in the birth rate preceded a decrease in the death rate.
Thirdly, the mortality decline was not initiated by an increase in GDP per capita, but by a from an economic point of view rather exogenously determined epidemiological transition. Appendix I provides examples in accordance with these stylized facts pictured in gure 1.1.
Classical Unied Growth Theory
When constructing a unied growth model, it is usually suggested that population growth formerly seemed to outperform growth in production, causing stagnation, whereas in more recent times population growth is observed to have slowed down, oering the potential for economic growth. The aim of this chapter is to build a mathematical framework of macroeconomic shortrun mechanisms that can account for these stylized facts.
Historical Background
The Malthusian law of population is one of the great achievements of thought.
Together with the principle of the division of labor it provided the foundations of Malthusian trap cease to operate? could be traced back to classical economic theory, which had already deeply inuenced philosophy and natural sciences until the middle of the 19th century and whose agenda was not much dierent from that of current unied growth theory. Over a full century, roughly ranging from 17701870, when economics was known as political economy, demographics played a vital role in the theory of growth. The earlier mercantilist theory, facing regular devastating mortality crises, had
viewed a large population as the fundament of (total) national economic prosperity in the international race for scarce resources (see for example Mun 1664). Thereafter, Turgot (1770), witnessing the French population explosion, seems to have been one of the rst authors to announce a law of diminishing returns to labor, according to which a constant production factor (e.g. capital, land) would limit the rise of productivity per person induced by an increase of the labor force. A few years later, Smith (1776) partly revised this physiocratic view in the light of the English Industrial Revolution by stating that high population density and urbanization would cause a greater variety of professions, raising the degree of specialization. If increasingly specialized individuals would reasonably engage in trade, the division of labor between these subjects would be enhanced, raising production more than proportionally. Another twenty years later however, the idea that the wealth of nations was based on population growth was struck again when it had become clear that in spite of great technological advances resulting from the division of labor, the English population explosion had eectively pushed down real wages. Malthus (1798) proposed the principle of population, by stating that population had the inherent tendency to inevitably outgrow production.
Another ve years later however, Malthus (1803) provided the great preventive check as apparently constituting the only justiable remedy for economies facing excessive population growth and by which individuals were generally susceptible to birth control.
Since then, as predicted by the rst professor of political economy, fertility abated and productivity increased.
Although the vaguer intuitions of the classical economists, as Keynes (1933) put it, provided much deeper and more profound insights than those of modern unied growth theorists, the verbal form of their arguments has at the same time tended to be more favorable to misinterpretations. It is the intention of this work to identify some of those misinterpretations and to partly restore the main ideas of classical growth theory.
When Senior (1836) contributed an article to the Encyclopaedia Britannica with the title An Outline of the Science of Political Economy, he endeavored to summarize the collected scholarly principles of the time, or in other words, the prevailing mainstream theory on economic growth. According to him, there existed common agreement among classical economists with regard to the subsequent four principles.
The Classical Mechanism of Stagnation
The principle of diminishing returns. It is a wellestablished fact in neoclassical economic theory that increasing the amount of labor tends to increase overall production.
Nevertheless, by holding the stock of all other production factors constant, an incremental amount of labor is generally acknowledged to yield diminishing returns, i.e. to decrease labor productivity. Often referred to as the principle of diminishing returns to labor (in the following Principle of Diminishing Returns (PoDR)), the mathematical formulation of this eect is displayed by the use of the static neoclassical production function developed by Wicksteed (1894) and Clark (1907) and was popularized by Cobb and Douglas (1928) . Accordingly, the PoDR provides a negative static causal eect running from labor to productivity. To allow for a clear empirical distinction between the static eect of the PoDR and the dynamic eect of labor division on production, the PoDR will subsequently be greatly simplied. Firstly, as part of a unied model including demographic changes, it will be found useful to replace the term labor with the more general concept population (N ). Secondly, the negative static causality will be measured using a contemporaneous relationship between GDP per capita(y) and population and is reduced to changes in the denominator of the identity y t ≡ Y t /N t , where the time index t refers to the corresponding year. The resulting causal eect might be written as ∂y t /∂N t < 0, where a newborn individual will by denition instantly aect GDP per capita. Production (Y ) remains unaected by the PoDR, and population as a production factor will be modeled separately as part of the division of labor.
The principle of labor division. The second principle relates the production factor labor positively to its level of production and comprises the benets derived from the division of labor. For simplicity, this relationship will be termed the Principle of Labor Division (PoLD) and the variable population will again be substituted for pure labor.
The eect stemming from the PoLD can be interpreted to correspond to the Kremerian (1993) (or Boserupian 1965) idea by which a larger population raises the chance to discover more productive innovations, although the Smithian principle is less owed to probability, but the logical consequence of a more sophisticated process of specialization.
As Young (1928) However, an increase in population will not yield benets from the division of labor contemporaneously, but rather lagged. With respect to a newborn individual, the minimum delay to account for a positive increase in production as a response to an increase in population is given by the time span reserved for a basic education, enabling the succeeding generation to participate in the labor market, i.e. to produce. For simplicity and as it is sucient to illustrate the role played by the PoLD in the classical framework, only one birth cohort lagged by one generation will subsequently be employed in the production function of the form Y t = N t−g .
The above two principles can be formally summarized in the following way.
To provide a simple linear relationship, the identity can be approximated using growth rates.
whereN , the natural growth rate of population is given by the dierence between the birth rate BR = Births/P opulation and the death rate DR = Deaths/P opulation. SettingN t−g = BR t−g −DR t is justied by the assumption that the death of an average individual is assumed to have an immediate impact on the division of labor, abstracting from infant and child mortality.
Verbally, the principles might be formulated as follows. Firstly, that at the very moment of entering into the economy, every additional individual will statically lower production per capita (∂ŷ t /∂BR t < 0). Secondly, that with a delay of at least one generation, total production responds positively, proportionally and indenitely to an increase in population under the condition that the additional part of the population participates in the division of labor of the economy (∂ŷ t /∂BR t−g > 0 with g accounting for the generational lag).
10 Young (1928) , p. 35.
The principle of population. Having modeled the impact of population on productivity, the following principle determines the impact of productivity on population.
Similar to the PoLD, the third principle is much less utilized in neoclassical models and accounts for the principle of population (PoP). Malthus wrote quite unambiguously in his second proposition that population invariably increases, where the means of subsistence increase, [. . . ].
11
Since this work is less concerned with the philosophical argumentation of classical economics and more with the testability of its principles, it is sucient to assume a positive causal eect of a relative change in productivity (determining the means of subsistence per person) on population growth. Again, as the natural population growth rate consists of the dierence between birth and death rate, the eect of the PoP might be measured by the eects of changes in productivity growth on both vital rates separately. However, in this preliminary, simple version of a classical growth model, the eects on the death rate will be put back, as wealth eects seem to have played a minor role in the mortality decline and that the fertility decline was the decisive determinant of economic growth. 12 The relationship dening the PoP will subsequently be modeled by a positive eect running from GDP per capita to birth rate. While it is biologically evident that an income eect on birth rate cannot, on average, be realized earlier than nine months after a shock in GDP per capita, and accounting for a lagged fertility decision of not more than one year, it is plausible to suspect fertility to react on average at least one year after the shock took place. Consequently, the following relationship will be employed for simulation: ∂BR t /∂ŷ t−x > 0, with x = 1 accounting for the fertility lag.
The rst three principles can be interpreted to form the cycle of misery, which is a sucient macroeconomic mechanism to account for a model of stagnation. When mathematically formulating these principles, a resulting system of linear equations can be written as
11 Malthus (1826) , book I, ch. I.
12 Research suggests the following main factors to be responsible for the British mortality decline:
The disappearance of the plague (Cipolla (1971) ), the introduction of the potato (Nunn and Qian (2011)) and the eradication of smallpox (Davenport et al. (2011) ).
where two additional assumptions have been made to arrive at this system. Firstly, the length of one generation is reduced to fteen years, which seems to be the lowest plausible value. Secondly, since a relatively high persistence is observed for birth and death rates in the model of the demographic transition as opposed to the GDP per capita growth rate, they are assumed to strongly depend on their lagged values. Leaving some room for the interpretation of the relative operation of the principles over time, the magnitude of each eect is represented by an undened coecient.
Calibrating the system using α 1 = α 2 = α 3 = α 4 = −α 5 = 1, setting initial values BR 0 = 0.05, DR 0 = 0.04,ŷ 0 = 0.00 and simulating a one percent shock inŷ 15 yields gure 2.1, the cycle of misery. More explicitly, shocking the growth rate of productivity (ygr) in period fteen raises the birth rate (BR) one period later owing to the PoP. This increase in population instantly consumes the former gains in productivity due to the PoDR. Hereafter, fteen periods of stagnation follow until the larger birth cohort has come of age to participate in the labor market, thereby increasing productivity growth via the PoLD, resulting in a further increase of births and so forth. Over time, this shortrun mechanism leads to a steady increase in the level of production and population, whereas the growth rates as well as productivity are observed to be relatively stable over the long run. Consequently, the cycle of misery can account for the recorded stylized fact of economic stagnation.
2.3
The Classical Mechanism of Growth
The great preventive check. The last classical principle to be modeled refers to the great preventive check (GPC) by which the power of population is repressed from peopling a country fully up to the limits of subsistence. Contrasting the GPC with the PoP, it is advisable to return to Malthus' second proposition in full length:
Population invariably increases, where the means of subsistence increase, unless prevented by some very obvious and powerful checks.
The checks limiting the natural population growth rate can by denition be exhaustively Malthus' conclusion that it will be generally found true, that the increasing healthiness of a country will not only diminish the proportions of deaths, but the proportions of births and marriages. 14 13 Senior (1836) , p. 143: Our readers are of course aware that, by the word marriage, we mean to express not the peculiar and permanent connection which alone, in a Christian Country, is entitled to that name, but any agreement between a man and woman to cohabit under circumstances likely to occasion the birth of progeny.
14 Malthus (1826) , book III, ch. II.
As a consequence, the birth rate is positively causally determined by the death rate and the operation of the GPC is modeled by ∂BR t /∂DR t−x > 0, again delayed by the cumulative lag of pregnancy and fertility decision.
Nevertheless, a more precise mathematical formulation of classical growth theory requires the GPC to be further analyzed to clearly distinguish between the particular eects of mortality on fertility. For, on the one hand, there exist mortality eects that directly act on fertility, notably an inheritance eect and an infant mortality eect, while on the other hand, mortality eects operate indirectly through the income channel, weakening the PoP. The latter will be named average income eect and sexual selection eect. To trace the evolution of those eects, gures 2.2 and 2.3 represent the stylized population structures for the years 1830 and 2010 respectively. For ease of illustration, populations are assumed to be stationary and stable, i.e. the birth rate equals the death rate and its relative age distribution does not change over time. The resulting cylindrical rather than pyramid form implies that every individual dies at the age of its life expectancy. 15 Average life expectancy can be recovered from the inverted death rate, which was roughly 0.02 in 1830 and 0.0125 in 2010, excluding infant mortality. The average income eect. To begin with the stylized population structure in 1830, individuals lived for 50 years on average, with the rst fteen years spent on education.
The fertility interval is taken to be constant, ranging from 1545 years. As a result, 86%
of the working population (beneting from increases in income) was fertile, whereas in 2010, when life expectancy was roughly 80 years, only 42% of the working population was capable of reproduction (see blue shaded area). Accordingly, positive GDP per capita growth was in the latter situation increasingly distributed to infertile individuals of high age, who were not even able to convert the additional income into children. It is quite obvious that, if wealth is mainly distributed to an infertile population, Malthus' notion that population invariably increases where the means of subsistence increase ceases to be true. This shift in social fertility is the rst eect that can account for a breakout from the cycle of misery.
The sexual selection eect. Furthermore, it can be observed that the life period during which the average individual earned its maximum income (green line) shifted 15 The eect of early mortality is dealt with as part of the infant mortality eect .
from the young age of 2035 years in 1830 to the old age of 4560 years in 2010.
As it is wellknown that individuals' choices on their partners are in a high degree positively aected by the latter's social rank, and as the individuals' social rank is quite reliably reected by its relative level of income, it is a logical inference to presume a postponement of marriages between 1830 and 2010, resulting in an increasingly delayed fertility decision.
The inheritance eect. Thirdly, the birth rate is directly aected by the death rate of those individuals who possess a part of the economy's wealth. With the death of such an individual, its possession is usually bequeathed to the succeeding generation.
Since the age of women at their rst birth was approximately 25 years in 1830 and has not changed drastically over the last two hundred years and since their husbands are currently, quite similar to 1830, on average merely three years older, inheritance is quite universally passed to the ospring some 25 years before their own deaths. 16 Consequently, average age of inheritance was approximately 25 years in 1830 and around 55 years in 2010 (see black bar). Since early inheritance formerly allowed individuals to take over and make use of their parents' capital, often in form of a business, it tended to greatly increase their income and social rank, favoring early marriage and subsequently conversion of wealth into progeny. Until 2010 however, the channel for translating inherited wealth into a higher number of ospring was increasingly closed down, as the heir will with a high probability have arrived at an infertile age.
The infant mortality eect. Complementing the above impact of the death of an old individual on fertility, the early death of individuals at a very young age provides another wellknown direct reason for high birth rates, completing the generation conict.
The diminution of infant and child mortality in the aftermath of the epidemiological transition seems to have induced parents to dispose of some formerly necessary replacement births (See for example Haines 1998). Over time, this eect eased the social pressure on individuals to marry early, further postponing reproduction.
Summing up the outcome of these four eects of mortality on fertility, it might be stated that if two succeeding generations exist at the same time, a further rising life expectancy will progressively cause a generation conict, forcing young individuals to preventively check their fertility.
As should have become clear by now, in classical theory the great preventive check accounts for the missing link between the mechanism of stagnation and the mechanism 16 See for example Hajnal (1965) or Clark (2007) for historical marriage pattern.
of growth and was intended by Malthus to solve the economic problem. The direct mortality eects on fertility and the indirect eects operating through the income channel are incorporated into the mechanism of stagnation by employing the following system of equations.
where the coecients α 2 = 10 * DR t−1 and α 6 = α The results from the simulation are displayed in gure 2.4. The rst 100 periods of the simulation correspond to the evolution of the regime of stagnation as it has been modeled before, following a shock inŷ t . The second part accounts for the evolution of the regime of growth and is triggered by the linear decline in death rates. This decline decisively induces the progressive operation of the great preventive check according to the rst equation of (4). Owing to the direct mortality eect, the birth rate eventually declines even more rapidly than the death rate. In the case of the indirect eects, the shortrun conversion of productivity into births owing to the PoP decreases in magnitude. Put dierently, the potential for economic growth is triggered by the fact that birth cohort size decreases over time. If the ratio BR t /BR t−15 was larger than one, the negative eect of diminishing returns due to an evergrowing population outweighed the positive longrun eect of the birth rate on labor division. However, as long as the ratio BR t /BR t−15 decreases, i.e. the birth rate declines over the course of one generation as is observed in gure 2.4, the ratio between unproductive and productive individuals abates as well. In this case, the productivity gains from labor division outperform the losses from diminishing returns, resulting in the observed stylized facts. This simulation aords a conrmation of the modeled mechanisms of stagnation and growth to match the stylized facts, furnishing classical growth theory with a consistent mathematical framework. This paper will retain the traditional VAR approach for the following reason. While the above estimations were usually based on the usage of a level variable of real wages or real GDP per capita, they will in this case be replaced with growth rates of real GDP per capita, which is justied as follows. Firstly, the major part of the true relationships between the variables becomes linear only when employing growth rates, and a linear relationship is required to apply a simple OLS estimation. Secondly, as growth rates display the same unit of measurement across economies, cross-country data could be used to assess international comparisons. Thirdly, instead of level variables, growth rates are most arguably stationary, which is required to avoid spurious autoregressions when not accounting for cointegration.
Vectorautoregression
To evaluate the hypotheses in question, the statistician faces the problem of endogeneity between the variables birth rate, death rate and GDP per capita growth. Eckstein et al. (1986) suggested a VAR model as being capable of solving this problem by treating all variables as endogenous. Initially, the system constructed in the last chapter might be written in matrix notation as
The idea of the VAR approach is to recover the relevant coecients from an OLS regression of contemporary values on lagged values of the variables and to use the recorded parameters to project the average impact of an exogenous shock in one of the variables. The obtained impulse response functions are expected to conform to the classical principles as formulated in chapter three. However, for the linear system to qualify as a VAR representation, some further reservations will be made in the following.
Stationarity of the Variables
An OLS estimation over time requires at least some of the single data series to be stationary, as integrated or trended variables will almost certainly give spurious results.
Since the English and Welsh data 17 provide the longest national time series available, ranging from the year 1541 to 2010, tests on the order of integration as well as the tests for lag selection will be representatively conducted on this sample. The annual data on which the VAR model will be based are displayed in gure 3.1.
18
In the case of GDP per capita growth, the results from running Augmented Dickey
Fuller tests on nonstationarity seem to unequivocally indicate stationarity of the variable, while the application of the same test to death rate and particularly to birth rate does not always reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity on a 1% level (see table   3 .1). Indeed, the pattern of birth rate and death rate has led to an extensive debate on their order of integration.
Firstly, following Nicolini (2007) , vital rates could be treated as stationary variables, as it seems implausible to believe that they have ever exceeded a certain maximum value, say ten percent, or that they have fallen below a minimum value, say zero, in the long run. Despite vital rates displaying high persistence, they may generally be assumed to be stationary, as their values represent (population) growth rates and are by denition restricted to lie within the range (0,1). Accordingly, they cannot in reality follow a random walk or a trend and the assumption 0 < α 1 , α 3 < 1 should hold. Nevertheless, stationarity of these two variables might be questioned by having found evidence of the variable natural population growth rate being stationary on a 1% level (see table 3.1).
17
In the following referred to as the English data.
18 GDP per capita growth is divided by ten for better visualization. As the latter is by denition a linear combination of birth rate and death rate, there is strong indication for the vital rates being cointegrated (see e.g. Herzer et al. (2012) ).
However, as was pointed out by (Fanchon and Wendel (2006) ), "VAR models can be estimated with data on stationary and non-stationary variables if the non-stationary data is also cointegrated because recent theoretical work proves that estimation with such data will yield consistent parameter estimates." 19 Thirdly, as was suggested by 
that might be rewritten as Y t , each variable is allowed to react within the current period to a shock in any of the variables of a higher ordering, while it is completely unresponsive to shocks in variables that are lower in the ordering. In this context, yearly demographic variables seem to t the framework almost ideally as it can be clearly distinguished between contemporaneous and lagged eects. In the last chapter it was concluded that childbirth rarely takes place in the same year as the fertility decision, in particular due to a pregnancy lag. Since this natural lag prevents it from being contemporaneously eected by death rate and GDP per capita, birth rate is the only plausible candidate to be the rst variable in the vector Y t . Furthermore, the death rate is placed as second variable to preserve the possibility of contemporaneous eects on GDP per capita due to the PoDR and the PoLD, which have so far been assumed to neutralize each other. As a consequence, it is assumed that a change in GDP per capita does not aect the death rate in the same year, while a delayed negative eect retains the possibility of an endogenized mortality, yielding the following system to be estimated:
The exogenous trend employed in the simulation is supposed to be captured by Φ 1 .
Lag Order Selection
In the foregoing simulation, the benets from the division of labor were strongly simplied. However, there are at least two important reasons complicating their measurement in empirical analyses. Firstly, since national data are used without accounting for the international labor division, the eects of foreign population growth on domestic output are not captured in the regression. Since external trade shocks might be suspected to cause a major part of the strong uctuations of GDP per capita data as shown in gure 3.1, this eect should not be underestimated. Secondly, to roughly illustrate the positive delayed eect of births on the labor market, a lag of fteen years was employed in the simulation. For all real applications, the exact timing of an average individual entering the division of labor cannot be suciently determined, much less the resulting benets. Accordingly, it is assumed that a VAR model is too costly in terms of pa-rameters to be able to signicantly estimate the eect of the PoLD after one generation and the fteenth lag will be eliminated from estimation. This issue will be dealt with in future research. On the other hand, omission of the fteenth lag increases the number of degrees of freedom, which is valuable when using small sample sizes. It would nevertheless be advisable to include a third lag by which some additional information regarding the PoLD, stored in the remaining error terms, might be captured. The use of a VAR (3) The initial shock instantly aects the assigned contemporaneous variables and subsequently propagates through the system. Since childbirth is, as a response to shocks in death rate and GDP per capita growth, most arguably spread over a number of years, it is reasonable to expect accumulated orthogonalized impulse response functions to yield a more pronounced eect. On the other hand, as the period in question should not exceed the short term, a time horizon of more than ve years seems inappropriate granting that the fertility decision is usually made after four periods and that a longer horizon will not provide additional information. If the considerations made in chapter three are correct, the causalities given by the estimated cumulative orthogonalized impulse response functions (coirfs) following a shock in u should be of the form
where (+) 1 is expected to display the positive average eect of the GPC and (+) 
Estimation Results
Simulation
As a very useful reference point, it is advisable to rst run the above VAR(3) estimation on the simulation given by gure 2.4, i.e. eq. (5) using the corresponding calibration from chapter 2. 21 The coirfs resulting from this estimation are expected to deliver a benchmark against which the ensuing real samples might be compared. The size of the shocks is given by the standard deviation of the corresponding variables. The universal average eect of the GPC seems well exposed in the upper central graph of gure 3.2. with a maximum lag length of three. Instead, the undistorted contemporaneus annual eect of the PoDR is signicantly displayed in the bottom left graph.
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The computed coirfs from running the VAR(3) model on the English data are displayed in Figure 3 .3. The eect stemming from the PoP is roughly in line with that of the simulated model. The reaction of birth rate to a shock in GDP per capita growth is positive and signicant on a 1%-level in the rst period already, indicating a quick fertility adjustment, and accumulates in magnitude over the subsequent periods. With regard to the GPC, a death rate shock does not induce birth rate to react after one period, pointing at a lagged fertility decision. After four years however, the positive eect becomes statistically signicant on a 5%-level, providing evidence of a positive causal relationship. 
Time-varying eects
When accounting for the time-varying eects modeled in the rst dierence equation of eq. (4), classical theory suggests that the GPC grows stronger whereas the PoP grows weaker during the transition to growth. Again following Nicolini (2007) , a straightforward way to measure their evolution in the form of average mortality and income eects, which are supposed to increasingly respond to the declining level of the death rate, is to split up the English sample into an early period of economic stagnation and high mortality and a late period of economic growth and low mortality and to compare the respective coirfs. As, in accordance with the stylized facts, the growth take-o corresponds to the fertility decline, 1815 is chosen as the cuto year, as it exhibits the maximum value and a structural break for birth rates. However, with the rst sample employing 271 observations and the second sample using 192 observations only, the outcome can merely be considered as indicative evidence. at the same time operates towards lower mortality. These authors regard the statistically signicant positive eect of GDP per capita growth on birth rate as evidence of preventive checks in general, which are not to be confused with the GPC. Accordingly, if income is observed to raise births on average, it is a sign that reproduction has formerly been suppressed by preventive fertility behavior. Equally, they hold the apparent negative causal relationship between GDP per capita and death rate to universally reect positive checks. Their idea is that whenever living standards would fall below a subsistence level, the positive checks are supposed to increase the death rate as a general result of individuals heavily competing for the remaining resources.
This eect deserves attention and could be added to the simulation to complement the mechanism of stagnation by providing another channel of population growth. In this paper, the modeling of the eect of conventional positive checks has been disregarded for two reasons. Firstly, it does not provide explanatory power for the mechanism of growth, since the positive checks are thought to disappear at the same time as GDP per capita rose above subsistence level. When modeling and evaluating the growth regime, it is regarded to be sucient to focus on the steady decline of fertility as the crucial factor contributing to the population slowdown inducing the breakout from stagnation.
More importantly, the current conventional interpretation of preventive and positive checks is at odds with Malthus' denition stating that the preventive check is perhaps best measured by the smallness of the proportion of yearly births to the whole population, which are best measured by the level of the death rate. Consequently, the preventive checks ought not to be measured by the causal relationship running from GDP per capita to fertility, which is reserved for the PoP. Instead, it might be very generally concluded that a low birth rate is a sign of the operation of preventive checks, whereas a high death rate reveals the operation of positive checks. Naturally, this implies an important Malthusian insight that has already been hinted at that the regime of stagnation is characterized by high mortality and the regime of growth by low fertility.
23 Malthus (1826) , book II, ch. XI.
24 Malthus (1826) , book I, ch. II.
Conclusion
The purpose of this work was to provide and validate a theory that solves the economic problem, or in other words, to disentangle the eects responsible for a historical regime of economic stagnation and for a regime of economic growth. Hitherto, the eld of unied growth theory has attempted to oer a theoretical analysis of the relationship between the demographic transition and the economic transition to growth that is observed in the form of stylized facts. In the present paper, having retraced unied growth theory to its classical predecessor, four classical elementary principles were interpreted to account for the relevant interactions between demographic and economic variables. While the principle of diminishing returns and the principle of labor division are commonly acknowledged in economic theory in one form or another, the existence of the principle of population remains debated. Furthermore, the great preventive check has even been ignored in recent evaluations of the Malthusian model. However, when accounting for the last two principles, classical theory is found to match the stylized facts. To trigger the transition to economic growth, it proposes to reduce mortality or, what is nearly the same, to increase life expectancy. Theoretically, this eect is justied by the fact that the demographic structure resulting from such a change is much less prone to overpopulation, as a major part of the population becomes infertile.
Eventually, as it is not sucient to construct a model that ts the stylized facts, the operation of the classical principles had to be evaluated collectively to avoid the reasonable impression of reverse engineering. To this end, a simple VAR estimation provided a way to establish evidence of the suggested classical causalities by employing cumulative impulse response functions derived from three historical samples, based on approximately 4,500 observations on annual national data of birth rate, death rate and GDP per capita growth. In those cases, in which causalities were a priori supposed to be measurable, in particular for the great preventive check and the principle of population, the impulse responses yielded strong support. Additional robustness tests conducted with regard to countryspecic eects and timevarying coecients were generally in line with the author's interpretation of the classical principles. Potential future results from using a VEC or SVAR interpretation instead of a traditional VAR or from employing timevarying coecients are not expected to yield very dierent results. Also, it has been suggested that recent publications might require reconsideration regarding the use of positive checks and preventive checks, as they seem to be at odds with Malthus' original terminology.
With the establishment of the principle of population and the great preventive check, classical theory yields an explanation that can solve the demographic economic paradox, which states that economies with higher GDP per capita tend to exhibit lower birth rates. For policy implications, it is important to realize that there exists no such negative causal link running from living standards to fertility. On the contrary, development support in the form of wealth might even aggravate the population problem.
As a consequence of the great preventive check, the most practicable and probably most human way to limit population pressure consists in a reduction of the death rate that is largely kept high by epidemics such as currently in equatorial areas. This reduction of mortality will certainly raise the population pressure on the upcoming generation for some time and correspondingly increase poverty. However, so far no instance has been observed in which decreasing fertility and increasing GDP per capita was not preceded by such a transitional period.
Notwithstanding the empirical validation of these eects, an important shortcoming of this work lies in the omission of the eects to be observed from the principle of labor division. Until they can be measured, the classical unied growth model cannot be said to have been fully conrmed by the data.
Appendix I hun-swi
